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Erb and Morensen: Wyoming Fetal Rights - Why the Abortion Albatross Is a Bird of a

WYOMING FETAL RIGHTS-WHY THE ABORTION
"ALBATROSS" ' IS A BIRD OF A DIFFERENT
COLOR: THE CASE FOR FETAL-FEDERALISM
I should like to know if taking this old Declaration of
Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon
principle, and making exceptions to it, where it will stop. If
one man says it does not mean a Negro, why not another say
it does 2not mean some other man? - President Abraham
Lincoln
IT]he word "person," as used in the FourteenthAmendment,
does not include the unborn. - Justice Harry Blackmun3
Abortion is a subject which quickens the pulse of Americans like
no other. What a particular Presidential candidate campaigns and
says about abortion often becomes a determinative issue. Supreme
Court nominees are grilled ruthlessly on CNN regarding their "views"
on abortion.4 Protestors have sunk to levels of terror and intimidation
by bombing and blockading abortion clinics and murdering clinic doctors, while abortion advocates spit and yell at anti-abortion6 proponents.' Americans on both side of the issue are frustrated.
With all the controversy surrounding the abortion issue, it must
be questioned why this civil liberty issue is resolved and decided in
the once hallowed halls of the United States Supreme Court.7 Arguably, the Supreme Court's venture into abortion jurisprudence has

i. "Albatross" was the term for the abortion issue used by Professor John Hart Ely

in his article, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
946-47 (1973) (predicting that Roe would be a lasting decision because state legislatures wanted
to rid themselves of the "albatross" of the abortion issue). "Albatross" was also used by
David J. Zampa in his article, The Supreme Court'sAbortion Jurisprudence: Will the Supreme
Court Pass the "Albatross" Back to the States? 65 NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 731 n.l (1989)
(predicting that the United States Supreme Court would use Casey v. Planned Parenthoodto
reverse Roe v. Wade, and thus return the abortion issue to the states).
2. 2 TmE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHM LINCOLN 500 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953).
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
4. A Quota for Abortion Questions?, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1991, § 4 at 16.
5. Todd J. Gillman, Vigil Heldfor Slain FloridaDoctor, DALLAS MoRNINo NEws, March
13, 1993, at32A; Minnesota: Terry Attracts Counter-Demonstrators,Am.POL. NETWORK, May
5, 1992 (Pro-choice demonstrator pushed and spit on abortion opponent); Claudia Rosenbaum,
Protests at Clinics get 307 Arrested, WASL. Timws, Jan. 24, 1993, at A1; Gene Warner, Rescue
Leaders Promise to Fight - Jail Doesn't Deter Pastors from Anti-Abortion Work, BUFFALO
NEWS, Dec. 11, 1992, at 4 (Pro-Lifers want to welcome Clinton into office by predicting the
increase of bombing and burning of abortion clinics in the coming year).
6. See, e.g., Thomas Sowell, Judicial Policy-Makers Pander to Public at Expense of
the Law, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 21, 1993 at 42.
7. Id.
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corrupted both executive politics and the Supreme Court confirmation
process Many Americans disregard the important economic and foreign policy issues of a Presidential campaign and vote solely on the
abortion issue. 9 The predominant factor in confirming a Supreme

Court nominee is the abortion issue, while other important areas of
American jurisprudence are ignored. Surely a more competent and
efficient forum exists in which to resolve the issue. In fact, that forum
clearly does exist-state legislatures. 10 Allowing the state legislatures

to decide the abortion issue permits advocates from both sides to
lobby and participate in the traditional political process."
The purpose of this comment is not to discuss whether abortion
is or is not socially desirable. Rather, the objective of this comment
is to explain why the United States Supreme Court is not the proper
governmental body to settle this important issue. This explanation
will be developed in a four-fold manner. First, the comment will show

that fetuses 12 are currently entitled to various protections and rights

8. Id.
9. See Catholic Bishops: Abortion Issue "Could Cause Cold War, " AM. POL. NETWORK,
Jan. 13, 1993 (stating that the Presidential campaign unambiguously identified itself with abortion rights); Laurence I. Barrett, Abortion: The Issue Bush Hopes will Go Away, Tre, July
13, 1992, at 28 (stating that one-third of citizens would vote for pro-choice politicians "regardless of the candidate's position on other issues").
10. Sowell, supra note 6. Even abortion advocates agree that legislative decisions would
further their cause, as opposed to Supreme Court "legislation:"
[T]he decision may well have created the Moral Majority, helped defeat the equal
rights amendment, and undermined the women's movement by spurring opposition
and demobilizing potential adherents. At the same time, Roe may have taken national
policy too abruptly to a point toward which it was groping more slowly, and in the
process may have prevented state legislatures from working out long-lasting solutions
based upon broad public consensus.
Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. Rav. 751, 766 (1991).
11. See id. One state legislature has expressed its frustration with not being able to adequately deal with the abortion issue:
It is the intention of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to reasonably
regulate abortion in conformance with the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court of January 22, 1973. Without in any way restricting the rights of privacy of
a woman or the right of a woman to an abortion under those decisions, the General
Assembly of the State of Illinois do solemnly declare and find in reaffirmation of
the longstanding policy of this State, that the unborn child is a human being from
the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person for purposes of the unborn
child's right to life and is entitled to the right to life from conception under the laws
and Constitution of this State. Further, the General Assembly finds and declares that
the longstanding policy of this State to protect the right to life of the unborn child
from conception by prohibiting abortion unless necessary to preserve the life of the
mother is impermissible only because of the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court and that, therefore, if those decisions of the United States Supreme Court are
ever reversed or modified or the United States Constitution is amended to allow
protection of the unborn then the former policy of this State to prohibit abortions
unless necessary for the preservation of the mother's life shall be reinstated.
ILL. ANN.

STAT. ch. 720, para. 510(1) (Smith-Hurd 1992) (emphasis added).

12. Due to the confining doctrine of political correctness and the inherent inconsistencies
of the law, it is difficult to determine exactly what a fetus should be called. When confronted
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under Wyoming and other states' laws. Second, it will observe that
these protections and rights appear inconsistent with the tenet that
fetal development can be legally terminated simply because a fetus
is not considered a person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Third, it will demonstrate that the
abortion controversy at the national level has been caused by an everexpanding United States Supreme Court usurpation of state legislative
functions. Finally, the comment will observe that this judicial usurpation has resulted in a substantial erosion of traditional principals
of federalism, and will suggest remedial measures which would return
the abortion issue to the state legislatures.
RIGHTS OF THE UNBORN

Wyoming recognizes a variety of fetal rights. A fetus in Wyoming
is afforded property rights, welfare and worker's compensation benefits, tort law remedies, and criminal protections. Traditionally,
Wyoming also provided fetuses with constitutional protections and
the right to life. However, these constitutional protections were taken
away in large measure through the seminal decision of Roe v. Wade. 3
Though the scope of Roe has been limited by recent Supreme Court
abortion jurisprudence, 4 Wyoming's legislature and judiciary still
cannot furnish fetuses with a level of state constitutional protections
that are consistent with the other Wyoming fetal rights and remedies."
An overview of Wyoming law demonstrates an inherently inconsistent legal treatment of fetuses. A newly conceived zygote may
be afforded property rights,16 yet a woman may abort a fetus of

with the same problem, another commentator stated:
It must be noted that in attempting to define the legal status of the unborn child,
one is immediately confronted with semantic problems. Perhaps the use of the phrase
"unborn child" is somewhat imprecise and even indicative of preconceived conclusions. But the use of terms like "embryo" or "fetus," which may be medically
precise, is grammatically awkward since they refer only to specific stages of gestation;
and such words as "quick" or "viable" are equally unclear since the law's use of
such words reflects little, if any, consistency with current medical theories or even
with the actual definitions of the words themselves.
William J. Maledon, Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRa DAmE LAW. 349, 350 (1971).

. 13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe v. Wade, through the Fourteenth Amendment, established
the right for a woman to choose to receive an abortion. As a result of this United State Supreme
Court decision, states were prohibited from enactir)g legislation forbidding abortions. Roe v.
Wade is discussed in greater detail infra text accompanying notes 75 through 94.
14. See infra notes 96 through 110 and accompanying text (discussing Webster v. Reproductive Health Services and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey).
15. Doe v. Burke, 513 P.2d 643, 645 (Wyo. 1973). The Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
"The regulation of abortions in this State is beyond the power of the courts and is solely a
matter for the legislature, which must, of course, give heed to the pronouncements of the
United States Supreme Court, particularly the summary appearing in Roe v. Wade." Id. (citation omitted).
16. See infra notes 21 through 23 and accompanying text.
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several months.17 One who kills a fetus by attacking the pregnant
woman or injures her as a result of driving while intoxicated, may
be deprived of his or her liberty,'" yet a physician who terminates a
pregnancy in the same stage remains unfettered.' 9 Of the rights that
are granted, some are defined statutorily, while others are based in
common law. With the exception of the right to live, a fetus is granted
personhood comparable to a born person. 20
Property, Entitlement and Worker's Compensation Rights of the
Unborn
The Preamble to the Wyoming Constitution states, "We, the
people of the State of Wyoming, grateful to God for our civil, political and religious liberties, and desiring to secure them to ourselves
and perpetuate them to our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution." ' 2 1 One of the rights the Wyoming people desire to perpetuate to their posterity is that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." 2 2 This due process
right has not been extended to fetuses before depriving them of life,
yet ironically due process does protect a fetus' rights in intestacy,
welfare, worker's compensation, tort, and criminal law.
Wyoming intestacy law recognizes that a fetus holds property
rights. For example, the Wyoming intestacy statute recognizes that
a fetus, from the time of conception, holds property rights in its
father's estate on equal grounds with the fetus' potential siblings, as

17. Wyoming statutes provide that "[an abortion shall not be performed after the embryo
or fetus has reached viability except when necessary to preserve the woman from an imminent
peril that substantially endangers her life or health, according to appropriate medical judgment." WYo. STAT. § 35-6-102 (1988). "Viability" is defined in Wyoming as "that stage of
human development when the embryo or fetus is able to live by natural or life-supportive
systems outside the womb of the mother according to appropriate medical judgment." Wyo.
STAT. § 35-6-101(a)(vii) (1988).
18. WYo. STAT. § 6-2-502(a)(iv) (1988) (stating that "[a) person is guilty of aggravated
assault and battery if he: [ilntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to a
woman he knows is pregnant."). This statute is a recodification of section 6-4-507 of the
Wyoming Statutes, which provided that "[w]hoever unlawfully kills an unborn child, or causes
miscarriage, abortion or premature expulsion of a fetus, by any assault or assault and battery
willfully committed upon a pregnant woman, knowing her condition, is guilty of a felony and
shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than fourteen (14) years." Wyo. STAT. § 64-507 (1977). Section 31-5-233 of the Wyoming Statutes allows for an elevated penalty if a
drunk driver "causes serious bodily injury to another person ....
" WYO. STAT. § 31-5-233(h)
(1988). "Serious bodily injury" exists when the injury "causes miscarriage ....
Id.
19. However, a non-physician who performs an abortion can be prosecuted. Section 356-111 of the Wyoming Statutes provide that "any person other than a licensed physician who
performs an abortion is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for
not less than one (1) year nor more than fourteen (14) years." WYO. STAT. § 35-6-111 (1988).
20. See infra notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text.
21. WYo. CONST. pmbl.
22. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added).
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if the fetus had been born.2 3 Even prior to the enactment of the
intestacy statute, Wyoming had adopted English common law, 4 which
traditionally recognized a fetus as a person. 25 This important common
law recognition of fetal personhood which was equivalent to the fetus'
siblings, is incorporated into Wyoming's intestate succession
potential
26
laws.

Not surprisingly, welfare entitlements are not contingent upon
birth. In Wyoming, a fetus is recognized as a child for purposes of
welfare entitlements, and is defined as a dependent child for public
assistance purposes. 27 This definition entitles a fetus to welfare ben-

23. WYo. STAT. § 2-4-103 (1980). This statute addresses a posthumous person's inheritance
rights, providing that "[plersons conceived before the decedent's death but born thereafter
inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent." Id.
24. Under English common law, an unborn child was recognized as equal to a born child.
See generally Burns v. Burns, 224 P.2d 178 (Wyo. 1950).
25. Id. The Burns court stated: "[T]here is no doubt that children born before or after
the execution of a testament stood on exactly the same footing insofar as the annulment of
the testator's will is concerned." Id. at 181. In the earlier Texas case of Nelson v. Galveston,
H. & S. A. Ry. Co., the court stated that:
[A] child in the mother's womb is a person in rerum natura [natural person], and
that by the rules of the civil and common law "she was, to all intents and purposes,
a child, as if born in her father's life-time." Speaking of the civil law, which limits
the operation of this rule to cases where it is for the benefit of the child to be
considered as born, he says it is to be considered as living for all purposes. Many
old English cases are cited in the case referred to deciding that such a child was held
to be living at the death of the testator; and that an unborn child was entitled, under
the "description of 'children born,"' as being within the reason and motive of a
gift. In Doe v. Clarke, 2 H.BI. 399, it was held "that wherever such consideration
would be for his benefit, a child en ventre so mere [in its mother's womb] should
be considered as absolutely born." Goodtitle v. Wood, 7 Term R. 103, is to the
effect that there is not difference between a child actually born and a child en ventre
so mere. Again, in Lancashire v. Lancashire, 5 Term R. 49, it is said: "No agreement
founded on law and natural justice is in favor of the child born during the father's
life that does not equally extend to a posthumous child." . . . Such is the doctrine
of cases decided in 1798, almost a century since, establishing the rights of such
children to that character of property, real estate ...
Galveston, 14 S.W. 1021, 1022-23 (Tex. 1890) (second emphasis added) (cited in S. Jeffery
Gately, Comment, Texas Fetal Rights: Is There a Future for the Rights of Future Texans?,
23 ST. MARY's L. J. 305, 307 n.21 (1991)). See also Thellusson v. Woodford, 31 Eng. Rep.
117, 163 (Ch. 1798). The English High Court of Chancery refuted the argument that a devise"
could not be appointed for a fetus because it was a non-entity:
Let us see, what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in a recovery, though
it is for the purpose of making him answer over in value. He may be an executor.
He may take under the Statute of Distributions.... He may take by devise. He
may be entitled under a charge for raising portions. He may have an injunction;
and he may have a guardian.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Maledon, supra note 12, at 362.
26. Section 2-10-102 of the Wyoming Statutes defines a person interested in the estate
as "any person entitled to receive or who has received from a decedent or by reason of the
death of a decedent any property or interest therein included in the decedent's estate." Wyo.
STAT. § 2-10-102(a)(iv) (1980). Section 2-4-103 declares that a posthumous child is entitled to
inherit as if it had been born. Wyo. STAT. § 2-4-103 (1980). See supra note 23 for the text
of the statute.
27. Section 42-2-104 of the Wyoming Statutes provides that"... For purposes of this
subsection, a dependent child includes any: (i) Unborn Child." Wyo. STAT. § 42-2-104(b) (1991).
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efits which cannot be restricted without due process of law. 21 In addition to welfare benefits, a fetus is also indirectly entitled to medical
care. 29 The classification of a newly conceived fetus as a person, with
due process rights, has caused further inconsistency in fetal law,30
where a fetus does not have due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3
Moreover, under Wyoming's worker's compensation scheme, a
fetus is a dependent for purposes of collecting death benefits. In
Wyoming Workers' Comp. v. Halstead, 2 the State Fund argued that
an illegitimate child, born after the putative father's death,33 was not
a statutory dependent of the father at the time of his injury or death.
Therefore, the Fund argued that the child was not entitled to benefits
arising from his father's death. 4 The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected this argument as unconstitutional. 5 The court held that discrimination based on the status of a child was not allowed under
both the Wyoming Constitution3 6 and the United States Constitution.37 The court stated: "As a matter of law, the prospective child
is a dependent of the putative father if in fact the child, when born,
is actually his child." 38 Though the court's holding is premised upon
unconstitutional classifications of the legitimacy of the child, the court
implicitly recognizes that a fetus is entitled to dependency benefits
under Wyoming's worker's compensation law.
When considering tort law, a fetus, besides being entitled to dependent benefits under worker's compensation, may apparently also

28. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260 (1970) ("The constitutional issue to be decided,
therefore, is the narrow one whether the Due Process Clause requires that the recipient be
afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termination of benefits"). Id.
29. Wyo. STAT. §§ 42-4-101 to -103 (1991). The Wyoming administrative regulations
declare that a pregnant woman is an eligible person for purposes of the Family and Children
Medicaid Programs. Though this does not make a fetus "an eligible" person, it does demonstrate Wyoming's concern that a fetus receive proper medical attention. Wyo. REG. IL.IV
§ 8(a).
30. See e.g., Maledon, supra note 12, at 369. See also infra notes 89 and 90 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
32. 795 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1990).
33. Id. at 761. The child was born May 1, 1986. The child's father was injured September
24, 1985 and died on December 4, 1985. There is no evidence that the father knew before he
died that he had impregnated the mother. Id. n.2.
34. Id. at 766-67. In order to receive death benefits, the child had to qualify under the
statutory definition of a child as found in section 27-12-102 of the Wyoming Statutes. That
provision provided that a child "means any individual excluding a parent or spouse of the
employee, who receives substantially all of his financial support from the employee preceding
injury or death of the employee ...." Wyo. STAT. § 27-12-102(a)(ii) (1977) (repealed 1986).
This statute has been amended to include the child, which was born posthumously, as a dependent. WYo. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(iii) (1991).
35. Halstead, 795 P.2d at 767.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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maintain a cause of action under Wyoming's Wrongful Death Statute. 9
Implied from the Wyoming Supreme Court's holdings in Wetering
v. Eisele, 40 Butler v. Halstead,41 and Wyoming Workers' Comp. v.
Halstead,42 is the notion that fetuses are included as valid wrongful
death claimants. In Wetering, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
the language found in the Wrongful Death Statute that defines who
is a valid claimant under the statute, "[elvery person for whose benefit such action is brought, ' 43 was meant to include persons defined
in Wyoming's intestacy statute." As discussed above, a fetus is defined as a person in the intestacy statute, 45 and therefore ostensibly
should have a cause of action under Wyoming's Wrongful Death
Statute for the death of relatives through which the fetus could inherit.4
In many states, the expansion of tort remedies to fetuses for
their own injuries is a growing area of law, 47 though Wyoming has

39. Section 1-38-101 of the Wyoming Wrongful Death Statute provides that:
Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default such
as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages
if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not
ensued is liable in an action for damages, even though the death was caused under
circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or second degree or manslaughter....
WYo. STAT. § 1-38-101 (1988). Section 1-39-102 provides that:
(c) The court or jury, as the case may be, in every such action may award such
damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as shall be deemed fair and just. Every person
for whose benefit such action is brought may prove his respective damages . . .to
which it considers such person entitled, including damages for loss of probable future
companionship, society and comfort.
WYO. STAT. § 1-38-102(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
40. 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984).
41. 770 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1989) (involving the same fetus discussed in Wyoming Workers'
Comp. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1990)). Though this case did not deal with the issue
of whether a fetus could maintain a wrongful death action, it did deal with whether the posthumously born child was the only person who could maintain the action. Id. This is consistent
with the court's holding in Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d. 1055 (Wyo. 1984).
42. 795 P.2d 760 (Wyo. 1990).
43. WYo. STAT. § 1-38-102(c) (1988).
44. Wetering, 682 P.2d at 1062. For Wyoming's intestacy statute, see Wyo. STAT. § 24-101 (Supp. 1992). For partial text of the statute, see infra note 88.
45. WYo. STAT. § 2-4-103 (1980). See text of statute, supra note 23.
46. This proposition was certainly not rejected by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Butler
v. Halstead, 770 P.2d 698 (Wyo. 1989). See supra note 41 and accompanying text. See also
David A. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. REv. 579 (1965).
47. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with
Women's ConstitutionalRights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599,
600 (1986). Some authors suggest that "[tihe intention in granting recovery in cases of [prenatal
injury] is ... to compensate the postnatal child for the affliction it must bear. Recovery is
not, therefore, a recognition that the prenatal child has legal rights." See Karen G. Crockett
& Miriam Hymas, Note, Live Birth: A Condition Precedent to Recognition of Rights, 4 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 805, 825 (1976). Yet this nonrecognition of "legal rights" is inconsistent with
the property rights granted and the appointment of guardians ad litem and trustees to protect
the interests of the unborn. See supra note 25 (Thellusson case stating fetus may have a guardian).
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not yet addressed the issue.4 Other states have begun to offer fetuses
a wide range of tort remedies for injuries suffered in the womb. Some
49
states allow suits for injury caused by the use of in utero drugs.
Many states allow wrongful death actions for the death of a fetus,
explicitly allowing for the "compensation for the loss of life."5 0 This
expansion of fetal tort remedies manifests itself also in the area of
criminal protections and sanctions.
Criminal Sanctions for Injuring the Unborn
From its very inception as a territory, Wyoming provided substantial protection for fetuses through its criminal laws. 5' Prior to
Roe, persons who performed 2 or provided abortion equipment were
criminally culpable." Additionally, women who sought to have an
abortion performed could be charged for committing a misde-

48. See infra note 49. The expansion of tort remedies to fetuses has been explained by
some as a state backlash resulting from Roe v. Wade. See Johnsen, supra note 47, at 611.
49. See, e.g., Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 896 (Mich. App. 1980).
50. Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11, 15 (Idaho 1982) (fetus killed in a car accident); Dunn
v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W. 2d 830, 832-33 (Iowa 1983); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d
633, 639 (La. 1981) (noting the "state's interest and general obligation to protect life"); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 425 A.2d 92, 95 (Vt. 1980); Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores,
300 So. 2d 354, 357 (Ala. 1974) (allowing suit for wrongful death of fetus "because the punitive
nature of our wrongful death statute demands the punishment of the tortfeasor"). For further
discussion of these cases and expanding fetal tort remedies, see Johnsen, supra note 47, at
602-04.
51. Congress established the Wyoming territory in 1868. Act of July 25, 1868, ch. 235,
15 Stat. 178. The first statutes enacted in the Wyoming Territory included the following:
... any person who shall administer, or cause to be administered, or taken, any
such poison, substance, or liquid, or who shall use, or cause to be used, any instrument of whatsoever kind, with the intention to procure the miscarriage of any
woman then being with child, and shall thereof be duly convicted, shall be imprisoned
for a term not exceeding three years in the penitentiary, and fined in a sum not
exceeding one thousand dollars ....
GEN. LAWS. OF WYO. ch. 3, § 25 (1869).
52. Section 6-77 of the 1957 Wyoming Statutes provided that:
Whoever prescribes or administers to any pregnant woman, or to any woman whom
he supposes to be pregnant, any drug, medicine, or substance whatever, with intent
thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman; or with like intent uses any
instrument or means whatever, unless such miscarriage is necessary to preserve her
life, shall, if the woman miscarries or dies in consequence thereof, be imprisoned in
the penitentiary not more than fourteen years.
WYo. STAT. § 6-77 (1957).
53. Section 6-105 of the 1957 Wyoming Statutes provided that:
Whoever prints or publishes any advertisement of any drug or nostrum with intent
to obtain utilization of such drug or nostrum for procuring abortion or miscarriage;
or sells or gives away, or keeps for sale or gratuitous distribution, any newspaper,
circular, pamphlet, or book containing such advertisement, or any account or description, of such drug or nostrum with intent to obtain utilization of such drugs
or nostrum to procure abortion or miscarriage, shall be fined not more than one
hundred dollars, to which may be added imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than six months.
WYo. STAT. § 6-105 (Supp. 1975).
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meanor.5 4 Subsequent to Roe," the Wyoming Supreme Court took
notice of that decision, and declared that even though the regulation
of abortion is a legislative decision, Wyoming's abortion statutes must
be held unconstitutional.16 Following Roe, Wyoming enacted new
abortion statutes.7 Under those statutes, an abortion is prohibited
after the point of viability. Furthermore, if a fetus survives an abortion, it must receive acceptable medical treatment.5 9
Wyoming further provides indirect protection for a fetus through
the criminal statutes. A person is guilty of aggravated assault and
battery if that person "[i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes
bodily injury to a woman whom he knows is pregnant." 6 In Goodman v. State,61 the Wyoming Supreme Court extended to fetuses
Wyoming's homicide statutes. 62 The Goodman court upheld the defendant's convictions for both the murder of the pregnant woman
and the subsequent death of the fetus caused by the assault and batdid
tery upon the mother. 63 The court held that the two convictions
4
not violate the defendant's right against double jeopardy.
Additionally, indirect fetal protection is provided by the Wyoming Driving While Under the Influence statute61 which provides penalties for one who kills a fetus. The statute calls for elevated
punishment for an intoxicated driver who "causes serious bodily in-

54. Section 6-78 of the 1957 Wyoming Statutes provided that:

Every woman who shall solicit of any person any medicine, drug or substance or
thing whatever, and shall take the same, or submit to any operation or other means
whatever, with intent thereby to procure a miscarriage (except when necessary for
the purpose of saving the life of the mother or child), shall be fined not more than
five hundred dollars and imprisoned in the county jail not more than six months;
and any person who, in any manner whatever, unlawfully aids or assists any such
woman to a violation of this section, shall be liable to the same penalty.
WYo. STAT. § 6-78 (1957). The statute applied to women who solicited abortions for female
companions or relatives, but apparently did not penalize men who were similarly situated. Id.
This distinction was recognized and declared unconstitutional in Doe v. Burke, 513 P.2d 643,
644-45 (Wyo. 1973). The court stated: "We see no logical reason why these statutes should
not also be held unconstitutional and void in their application to all women." Id.
55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. Doe v. Burke, 513 P.2d 643, 645 (Wyo. 1973). See also supra note 15.
57. Statute reprinted in full, supra note 17.
58. "Viability" is the point in fetal development at which the fetus can live outside the
woman's uterus. In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court held that a state may
prohibit an abortion after the point of viability. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. For the text of
Wyoming's post-Roe abortion statute, see supra note 17.
59. Section 35-6-104 provides that "[tlhe commonly accepted means of care shall be
employed in the treatment of any viable infant aborted alive with any chance of survival."
WYo. STAT. § 35-6-104 (1977).
60. WYo. STAT. § 6-2-502(a)(iv) (1988).
61. 601 P.2d 178 (Wyo. 1979).
62. See generally Wyo. STAT. §§ 6-2-101 to -107 (1988).
63. Goodman, 601 P.2d at 180.
64. id. at 185.
65. WYo. STAT. § 31-5-233 (1989).
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jury to another person." 66 "Serious bodily injury" is defined to include an injury which "causes miscarriage ... "67 This statute, though
dealing with the woman carrying the fetus, provides further sanctions
for the death of a fetus caused by one's drunk driving.
A cursory review of other states shows that statutory criminal
laws offer the widest range of fetal protections. 68 Many states have
feticide statutes which provide that the murder of a fetus be treated
in the same manner as the murder of a person. 69 Other states protect70
fetuses by expressly including them in the state's homicide laws.
Furthermore, some states prosecute pregnant drug users for delivery
of a controlled substance to a minor. 7' However, in recognition of
the United- States Supreme Court's holding in Roe, some states offer
no protection to a fetus. 72 Wyoming, through Goodman,73 is a state
which provides criminal protection for74 its unborn from conception
to birth through its homicide statutes.
Fetal Rights Do Not Include The Right to Life
All of the rights and protections discussed above are contingent
upon one decision-whether or not the woman terminates her preg66. Id. (h).
67. Id.
68. See Gately, supra note 25, at 317-18.
69. Margaret Phillips, Comment, Umbilical Cords: The New Drug Connection, 40 BuFF.
L. REV. 525, 543 n.108 (1992). See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 9-1.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); I4D. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1985); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.5-.8 (West Supp. 1991); MIcH.

COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1972); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 585:13 (1986); OKRLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 713 (West 1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04
(West 1988).
70. See e.g., Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (1989) (causing death of fetus through
reckless injury to mother is manslaughter); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West Supp. 1986) (defines
murder as "unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00
(McKinney 1987) (includes a fetus of twenty-four week gestational period within statutory definition of homicide); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (1989) (includes fetus within homicide statute);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West 1988).
71. Bringing charges against pregnant drug users for dealing drugs to their fetuses is a
relatively new prosecutorial strategy which can be charged because:
the woman's cocaine or crack use introduces the drug into the blood stream, and
the drug is ultimately "delivered" to the fetus via the placenta or the umbilical cord.
Prosecutors have defined "delivery" to the fetus as drug delivery to a minor conduct that is prohibited under criminal narcotics laws.
Phillips, supra note 69, at 525. See also David H. Montague & Sharon E. McLauchlin, Drug
Exposed Infants: En Ventre Sa Mere - And In Need of Protection, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 485
(1992); Sam S. Balisy, Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection
for the Fetus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209 (1987); Elizabeth L. Thompson, Note, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking Model for Lawmakers,
64 IND. L.J. 357 (1988-89); Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the
Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse, " 101 HARv. L. REV. 994 (1988); Ted Gest, The Pregnancy
Police, On Patrol, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 6, 1989, at 50.
72. Showery v. State, 690 S.W.2d 689, 692 (Tex. App. 1985) (the Texas murder statute
gives no protection until live birth); Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Ky. 1983)
(a live birth is required for conviction under Kentucky murder statute).
73. 601 P.2d 178 (Wyo. 1979).
74. Supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
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nancy. Though a fetus is entitled to due process rights in fetal property, welfare, worker's compensation and tort law, a fetus has no
due process to protect its life. Such an arbitrary standard seems inconsistent with even a relaxed understanding of due process. Yet this
nation's Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to choose
an abortion is necessary for the protection of a woman's fundamental
right to privacy. Clearly the United States Supreme Court has usurped
the state legislatures' function of balancing these two competing interests.
Though it is commonly recognized that Roe v. Wade- is the case
which legalized abortion in the United States, the legal underpinnings
of Roe began in the earlier contraception case of Griswold v. Connecticut.76 In Griswold, the United States Supreme Court expanded
its interpretation of the Constitution to include a right to an individual zone of privacy which must be free from state regulation. 77 In
Roe, the Supreme Court determined that the zone of privacy anenough to encompass a woman's denounced in Griswold was large
78
cision to have an abortion.
Roe announced a trimester approach for determining the allowable level of state intrusion during the various stages of pregnancy. 79
The gestational period was divided into three-month intervals.8 0 The
first three months must remain free of any state regulation of abortion." During the second three months, the state was allowed to reg-2
ulate abortion procedures only to protect the health of the woman.1
Throughout the final three months, the state could regulate to protect
the "potential life '8 3 of the fetus." Although the Roe Court rec-

75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

76. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy emanates from the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights).
77. Id. at 485. But see id. at 508 (Black, J.,dissenting) ("The Court talks about a
constitutional 'right of privacy' as though there is some constitutional provision or provisions
forbidding any law ever to be passed which might abridge the 'privacy' of individuals. But
there is not."); id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("But we are not asked in this case to say
whether we think this law is unwise or even asinine. We are asked to hold that it violates the
United States Constitution. And that I cannot do.").
78. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
79. Id. at 162-64. The constitutionality of the trimester system has been questioned by
scholars. See Henry M. Holzer, Texas v. Johnson, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 649, 655 (1990)
("there is no way-as a matter of grammar, syntax, or rhetoric-that a single sentence in
Amendment Fourteen can be read to divide the period of human gestation into trimesters, and
to prescribe in some detail differing abortion rights in each of them.") (quoting Mendelson,
Raoul Berger on The Fourteenth Amendment Corno Copia, 3 BENCHMARK Nos. 4 & 5, 205
(1987)).
80. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 122 through 126 (Justice Scalia criticizing the Roe
Court for assuming that fetal life is only potentially human).
84. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
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ognized a state's interest in protecting "potential life," ' , the Court
decided that the unborn are not "persons" for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment." This created the paradox of allowing a state
to recognize fetal property rights and fetal tort and criminal proteca state from recognizing a fundamental right
tions, while forbidding
7s
to fetal life.
The paradoxical recognition of fetal personhood for purposes of
inheritance rights directly conflicts with a woman's right to an abortion. Wyoming's probate code provides that the wife of an intestate
receives one half of her husband's estate if they have children, yet
stands to receive the entire estate if there are no children."8 Thus a
widow could gain another half of her husband's estate simply by

85. Id. at 162.
86. Id. Some post-Roe federal courts have not been so quick to dispel the notion that
a fetus may enjoy constitutional rights. In Douglas v. Town of Hartford, the federal district
court of Connecticut held that a fetus was a "person" as defined by Title 42, Section 1983
of the United States Code. 542 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (D. Conn. 1982). Section 1983 allows an
individual to recover in damages for governmental violation of a constitutional right. The court
allowed the child to bring suit under Section 1983 for injuries sustained by the fetus en ventre
from police brutality. What is remarkable about this holding is that since being enacted in
1871 as the Ku Klux Klan Act, Section 1983 has provided a federal forum for "anyone" who
has suffered constitutional injury at the hands of "any person" acting under color of official
government sanction. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Graham v. Connor, the United States Supreme
Court clarified that Section 1983 does not in itself provide substantive rights, but only provides
the forum vindicating one's federal civil rights. 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). Section 1983,
which is entitled Civil Action For Deprivation of Rights, provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). By holding that a fetus was "a person" entitled to constitutional
redress in Douglas, the court in turn recognizes constitutional rights in the fetus. 542 F. Supp.
at 1270. See also Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1421-23 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining a
posthumously born child as "a person" and allowing the child to bring suit for the death of
its father from police brutality). See also Richard P. Shafer, J.D., Annotation, Fetus as Person
on Whose Behalf Action May be Brought Under 42 USCS § 1983, 64 A.L.R. FED. 886 (1983).
87. At least one federal judge has recognized the paradox created by denying personhood
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gary-Northwest Indiana Woman's Servs. v.
Bowen, 421 F. Supp. 734, 737 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (Sharp, J.,concurring) ("we ought to reexamine
the denial of personhood to all unborn children .... the Court has now invited itself into a
medical and moral thicket.").
88. Wyoming Statutes provide:
(a) Whenever any person having title to any real or personal property having the
nature or legal character of real estate or personal estate undisposed of, and not
otherwise limited by marriage settlement, dies intestate, the estate shall descend and
be distributed in parcenary to his kindred, male and female, subject to the payment
of his debts, in the following course and manner:
ii) If the intestate leaves husband or wife and no child nor descendants of any
child, then the real and personal estate of the intestate shall descend and vest in the
surviving husband or wife,
WYo. STAT. § 2-4-101 (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
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aborting his unborn child.A9 This conflict was addressed two years
prior to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Roe:
The unborn child, under the law of property in most jurisdictions, can, among other things, inherit and own an estate, be a tenant-in-common with his own mother, and be an
actual income recipient prior to birth. The new liberalized
abortion laws, however, present a dilemma in this area. Is it
a crime for a woman to misappropriate the estate of her unborn child, and yet no crime for her to kill that child? Can
a woman, who has inherited an estate as a tenant-in-common
with her unborn child, increase her own estate 100 percent
simply by killing the child? Will the law which has recognized
the unborn child as an actual income recipient prior to birth
allow the child's heir (the mother) to kill the child for her
own financial gain? Will the law that has specifically said that
an unborn child's estate cannot be destroyed where the child
has not been represented before the court allow the child himself to be destroyed without being represented before the
court?90

89. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
90. Maledon, supra note 12, at 369. See also Jeffrey A. Parness & Susan K. Pritchard,
To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CiN. L. REv. 257,
265 (1982) (addressing section 2-108 of the Uniform Probate Code, which provides that,
'[rielatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they
had been born in the lifetime of the decedent."). Parness and Pritchard also articulate the
conflict in these terms:
[U]pon closer examination, however, it is apparent that the state's interest in promoting the unborn's potential for life may be undermined by treating the unborn's
interest as only contingent upon birth. For example, if an intestate is wealthy, there
might be a substantial incentive for a pregnant mother to abort the unborn child
she is carrying. By aborting her unborn child, the pregnant woman, as "surviving
spouse," could take the entire estate, while failure to abort would require her to
share the estate with the posthumously born "surviving issue." Thus, the Code inconsistently treats some unborn as "relatives" of an intestate decedent in order to
procure certain inheritance rights but provides an incentive to at least some mothers
to abort the potential lives of those "relatives." The state's legitimate interest in
'protecting the potentiality of human life" would warrant elimination of the incentive
to abort, especially because elimination of such an incentive would not provide the
pregnant woman with an additional obstacle to abortion. The Code could eliminate
this incentive simply by excluding, under certain circumstances, the inheritance that
otherwise would have gone to the aborted child.
Id. at 265. The conflict of interest is magnified by Wyoming's Felonious Death statute, which
does not permit one who feloniously takes the life of another to inherit from the deceased:
"No person who feloniously takes or causes or procures another to take the life of another
shall inherit from or take a devise or legacy from the deceased person any portion of his
estate." Wyo. STAT. § 2-14-101(a) (1980). This statute expressed the legislature's intent to codify
the common law principle that, "no man shall be permitted to profit by his own wrongful
act." See also Dowdell v. Bell, 477 P.2d 170, 173 (Wyo. 1970). This statute only applies to
those slain intentionally and wrongfully. Though it was not a felony for a woman to receive
a non-emergency, or "convenience" abortion under Wyoming's pre-Roe abortion statute, it
was a felony for a doctor to perform such an abortion. Wyo. STAr. § 6-77 (1957). It is plausible,
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Furthermore, courts have had difficulty reconciling the conflict
between fetal welfare benefits and the Roe decision. This inconsistency led one federal court to decide that:
An unborn child's lack of status as a "person" for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes does not affect the status of an unborn
child as a "child" within the meaning of the [Social Security]
Act; that a fetus is not constitutionally entitled as a person
to claim certain benefits in no way affects the right or power
of Congress to extend benefits to unborn children by appropriate legislation. 9'
This holding further demonstrates the incongruity that a fetus is entitled to due process in social security law, 92 yet is entitled to none
in its right to life.
Though the United States Supreme Court granted to women a
fundamental right to an abortion which trumps any due process or
property rights a fetus may possess in other areas of law, Roe made
it clear that states have compelling interests in the health of the woman
and the "potential life" of a viable fetus. 93 However, subsequent
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with state regulations governing the second and third trimesters applied a strict-scrutiny level
of review to all abortion-related regulation and struck down legislation which should have been allowed under the trimester guidelines
of Roe. 94 Indeed, abortion at any stage of pregnancy up to the point

therefore, that under Wyoming's pre-Roe statute, an abortion was: (1) an intentional act as
applied to the mother, and (2) a felonious act as applied to the doctor. Both requirements
having been met, such an abortion should have prevented a mother from receiving the inheritance of her aborted fetus. See, e.g, George M. Apostolos, Recent Case, Disposition of
Property Held by Entirety Where One Spouse Murders the Other, 6 Wyo. L.J. 266 (1951),
for further discussion of felonious death rule.
91. Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861, 864 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 926 (1975).
See also, Parness & Pritchard, supra note 90, at 263.
92. See Parks, 504 F.2d at 864; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260 (1970).
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
94. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983) (informed consent law places unreasonable obstacles to obtaining abortion); Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down
a Pennsylvania law which required a post-viability abortion to be performed in the manner
most likely to result in a live birth). Chief Justice Burger dissented in Thornburgh, and stated:
The Coun's ruling in this respect is not even consistent with its decision in Roe
v. Wade. In Roe, the Court conceded that the State's interest in preserving the life
of a viable fetus is a compelling one, and the Court has never disavowed that concession. The Court now holds that this compelling interest cannot justify any regulation that imposes a quantifiable medical risk upon the pregnant woman who seeks
to abort a viable fetus: if attempting to save the fetus imposes any additional risk
of injury to the woman, she must be permitted to kill it.
Id. at 808 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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of birth seemingly took on the cloak of an unconditional, fundamental, and inalienable right. 95
Yet beginning in 1989, with Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, % the absolute right to an abortion from conception-to-birth
has begun to show signs of retreat. 97 In Webster, the Court upheld
a Missouri statute banning all public employees from performing or
assisting
in abortions and the usage of public buildings for abortions. 98 Moreover, in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,"
the Court upheld a parental consent statute mandating that an abortionist inform a parent twenty-four hours before an abortion is performed on a minor. 1°0 Most recently, Justice O'Connor announced
the Court's joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,'0 1 which essentially rewrote all Supreme Court
abortion jurisprudence.
In Casey, Justice O'Connor adhered to Roe under principles of
stare decisis, but in actuality, only select portions of Roe survived
the Casey decision.51 Justice O'Connor held that a woman's fun-

95. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 783 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The extent to which the Court has departed from the
limitations expressed in Roe is readily apparent"). See also id. at 814 (White, J., dissenting)
("the majority indiscriminately strikes down statutory provisions that in no way contravene
the right recognized in Roe").
96. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
97. See supra text accompanying note 94. For a discussion of how states are expanding
their roles in protecting the unborn, see Stephanie R. Bryant, Note, Due Process: Minor's
Abortion Rights - Ohio's ParentalNotification Statute - An Anti-abortionStatute in Disguise?,
27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 605, 607-16 (1992). But see infra note 169 (discussing the Freedom
of Choice Act).
98. Webster, 492 U.S. at 511.
99. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
100. Id. at 506-07.
101. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Casey proved to be an immediately controversial decision
which angered people on both sides of the abortion controversy. See Wanda Franz, A Confused
and Arrogant Supreme Court Reaffirms the "Right" to Abortion, NATIONAL RIGHT To LIFE
NEWS, July 21, 1992 at 3; Sarah Gorin & Lorna Johnson, Reproductive Rights, THE ADVOCATE,
August 1992 at pp. 2-3 ("[tjhe Wyoming Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union is
deeply distressed over the Casey decision and the consequent loss of protection for each individual's fundamental right-of privacy.").
102. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818 (trimester approach is unnecessary to ensure a woman's
right to choose an abortion). However, Justice Scalia questioned the Court's application of
stare decisis, and said:
[The Court] insists upon the necessity of adhering not to all of Roe, but only to
what it calls the "central holding." Itseerus to me that stare decisis ought to be
applied even to the doctrine of stare decisis, and I confess never to have heard of
this new, keep-what-you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest version .... I am certainly
not in a good position to dispute that the Court has saved the "central holding"
of Roe, since to do that effectively I would have to know what the Court has saved,
which in turn would require me to understand (as I do not) what the "undue burden"
test means. I must confess, however, that I have always thought, and I think a lot
of other people have always thought, that the arbitrary trimester framework, which
the Court today discards, was quite as central to Roe as the arbitrary viability test,
which the court today retains. It seems particularly ungrateful to carve the trimester
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damental right to a pre-viability abortion remained intact, 03 but she
discarded the trimester approach articulated in Roe.' °4 She reaffirmed
that a woman has a right to an abortion, free from any "undue
burden," up to the point of viability. 05 After viability, a state may
regulate in such a manner as to protect the interest that it has in
pre-natal life.'0 6 Justice O'Connor suggested that "[in some broad
sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability
has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing
child.'

0 7

1

The joint opinion defined the restrictions which the state can
impose upon a woman after this implied consent occurs. Before viability, a state can regulate to protect the health and safety of the
woman, as long as the regulation does not impose an "undue burden"
on her right to have an abortion. 08 Furthermore, states may protect
framework out of the core of Roe, since its very rigidity (in sharp contrast to the
utter indeterminability of the "undue burden" test) is probably the only reason the
Court is able to say, in urging stare decisis, that Roe "has in no sense proven 'unworkable,"' . . . . I suppose the Court is entitled to call a "central holding" whatever
it wants to call a "central holding"-which is, come to think of it, perhaps one of
the difficulties with this modified version of slare decisis.
Id. at 2881 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
103. Id. at 2818.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2819. Justice O'Connor stated: "there is no line other than viability which is
more workable." Id. at 2817. Yet broad notions of viability waiver with time.,See Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting):
The Roe framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself. As the medical
risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the State may
regulate for reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth.
As medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the
fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward conception.
Id. Conception is a line that allows for no error.
106. Id. at 2817.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2820. What remains unclear, however, is what constitutes an "undue burden."
Justice Scalia indicates that the undue burden test applied by the joint opinion was not a test,
but was, rather, a fact-specific inquiry. He said:
To the extent I can discern any meaningful content in the "undue burden" standard
as applied in the joint opinion, it appears to be that a State may not regulate abortion
in such a way as to reduce significantly its incidence. The joint opinion repeatedly
emphasizes that an important factor in the "undue burden" analysis is whether the
regulation "prevent[s] a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion,"
... whether a "significant number of women . . . are likely to be deterred from
procuring an abortion," . . . and whether the regulation often "deters" women from
seeking abortions, . . . We are not told, however, what forms of "deterrence" are
impermissible or what degree of success in deterrence is too much to be tolerated.
If, for example, a State required a woman to read a pamphlet describing, with illustrations, the facts of fetal development before she could obtain an abortion, the
effect of such legislation might be to "deter" a "significant number of women"
from procuring abortions, thereby seemingly allowing a district judge to invalidate
it as an undue burden. Thus, despite flowery rhetoric about the State's "substantial"
and "profound" interest in "potential human life," and criticism of Roe for undervaluing that interest, the joint opinion permits the State to pursue that interest
only so long as it is not too successful.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2880 (Scalia, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations
omitted) (alteration in original).
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their interest in potential human life after viability by regulating and
proscribing abortion if they choose. 1°9 However, in promoting its interest in fetal life, a state cannot require a husband's consent before
an abortion is performed." 0 While Casey returned some autonomy
to the states, it did not return the authority to draw the line at conception, rather than viability.
JUDICIAL USURPATION-THE ABORTION ISSUE

In many aspects of Wyoming law, a fetus is clearly treated as
a "person.""' The obvious inconsistency lies in Wyoming's abortion
laws, which were written in light of Roe. Because of United States
Supreme Court opinions, Wyoming has been forbidden from assuring
its unborn, that in "their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit

of happiness, all members of the human race are equal.""

2

Value judgments, such as abortion, are best left to the state legislatures to address through the political process." 3 Yet this traditional
legislative function has been usurped by the United States Supreme
Court. In assuming itself to be a competent body to solve the national
the Casey Court only perpetdivision created by the abortion issue,
4
uated the problem created by Roe."
Not since the days of slavery has any single issue polarized this
nation as powerfully as the issue of abortion. The nation is now
divided because of a right which is not specifically enumerated in the
United States Constitution; a mere "penumbral"" ' 5 right forced upon
the states by the Supreme Court through the auspices of the Four-

109. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817-18.
110. Id. at 2829-30.
Ill. See supra notes 14-64 and accompanying text.
112. WYo. CONST. art. 1,§ 2. The Wyoming Constitution also provides that
rights is only made sure through
Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil
political equality, the laws of this state affecting the political rights and privileges
of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex, or any circumstance
or condition whatsoever other than individual incompetency, or unworthiness duly
ascertained by a court of competent jurisdiction.
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (emphasis added). A fair reading of this provision suggests that a
child cannot be deprived of its "natural and civil rights" simply because of its "circumstance
or condition," i.e. that it has not yet moved from inside its mother's body to outside its
mother's body.
113. See infra text accompanying note 126 (Justice Scalia stating that Roe v. Wade was
not based on any legal determination, but rather upon a value judgment). See also Casey, 112
S. Ct. at 2885 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Value judgments, after
all, should be voted on, not dictated .... ).
114. Justice Scalia said "by foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this
issue arouses . . .the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish." Casey, 112 S. Ct.
at 2885 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (penumbras of the First, Third,
Fourth and Fifth Amendments emanate a liberty interest in privacy).
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teenth Amendment. 1 6 The debate and hostility still prevalent twenty
years after Roe clearly demonstrates that the right to an abortion was
not deeply rooted upon a universally accepted freedom. 1 7 This section
will discuss how the Supreme Court, through Roe, created the tational division over abortion, and how the Casey decision will only
prolong the controversy.
The Roe Court declared: "[W]e need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins.""' Rather than brushing past that "difficult question," the Court should have focused on it as the threshold
judicial inquiry. Indeed, Wyoming, as well as many other states," 9
long ago decided the difficult question of when life begins, 20 yet the
United States Supreme Court simply chose to overlook that fact. How
can it be that one who has property rights and rights for redress of
injuries can be deprived of the right to life itself, which has been
called "the right to have rights?"' 12 An overview of Justice Scalia's

116. Actually, the will of the people of the various states was usurped by seven individuals
in Roe. But in Casey, it was down to a majority of only five life-appointed judges who chose
to impose their views on this nation, rather than allowing the elected legislatures to determine
whether or not a fetus deserves protection.
117. In its amicus brief for Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Utah argued that:
The continuing furor over Roe v. Wade demonstrates that the decision did not articulate a principle that is deeply rooted in the history and tradition of American
society.
Abortion remains a preeminently troublesome issue in the United States. In the
past year alone, thousands of demonstrators took to the streets to protest the regime
of abortion on demand erected by Roe v. Wade. Other thousands crowded public
squares to voice a contrary view. Ironically, all of this controversy flows from a
decision announcing a principle that is supposedly so "fundamental" as to be beyond
reasonable debate in American society.
Brief for the State of Utah as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Planned Parenthood of Southeast
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) [hereinafter Utah Briefn (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986)) (rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection
include those fundamental liberties that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if sacrificed).
118. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). However, what became apparent from Roe
and its progeny is that the United States Supreme Court had indeed decided when Fourteenth
Amendment life begins-it begins after live-birth. See supra note 94 and accompanying text
(discussing prohibition on abortion regulation throughout all stages of pregnancy). But see,
RONALD R. REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 22 (1984) ("The real
question today is not when human life begins, but, What is the value of human life? . . . The
real question for [the abortionist] and for all of us is whether that tiny human life has a Godgiven right to be protected by the law-the same right we have.") (emphasis in original). See
also, John A. Eidsmoe, A Biblical View of Abortion, J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 18 (1983)
("The difficult questions, however, are (1) Does abortion involve the killing of a human being
and (2) if so, when if ever is it justifiable?"). See also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2875 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The whole argument of abortion opponents is that
what the Court calls the fetus and what others call the unborn child is a human life.").
119. "Most other western nations that have dealt with abortion have done so as a matter
of political give and take." Utah Brief, supra note 117, at 14 (citing MARY A. GLENDON,
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987)).

120. See supra notes 51 through 54 and accompanying text.
121. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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opinion in Casey, which was joined by Justices
Rehnquist, White,
22
and Thomas, provides a helpful discussion.
Justice Scalia criticized the Casey Court's reliance on "reasoned
judgment" in reaffirming the Roe Court's presumption that fetal life
is merely potentially human. 123 He said: 'reasoned judgment' does
not begin by begging the question, as Roe and subsequent cases unquestionably did by assuming that what the State is protecting is the
mere 'potentiality of human life." ' 24 He went on to note that "whatever answer Roe came up with after conducting its 'balancing' is
bound to be wrong, unless it is correct that the human fetus is in
some critical sense merely potentially human. '"125 He concluded by
saying that "[tihere is of course no way to determine that as a legal
matter; it is in fact a value judgment."'26
The Roe Court claimed to be announcing a constitutional decision founded upon the notion that abortion is a liberty interest
which is protected by the United States Constitution. 27 In Casey,
Justice Scalia stated that "[tihe issue is whether [abortion] is a liberty
protected by the Constitution of the United States.' ' 28 He concluded
that "it is not."' 2 9 Justice Scalia went on to say that he reached "that
conclusion not because of anything so exalted as [his] views concerning the 'concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life." ' 30 Rather, he reached that conclusion
for the same reason "that bigamy is not constitutionally protectedbecause of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely noth-

122. Justice Scalia both concurred with and dissented from the opinion written by Justice
O'Connor. In his opinion, Justice Scalia made four significant points in support of allowing
state legislatures to decide the abortion issue rather than the Supreme Court: (1) abortion is

a value judgment, (2) Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided, (3) the "Undue Burden" test is
completely unworkable, and (4) the joint opinion in Casey relied on an improper application
of the doctrine of stare decisis to reach its result. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2873-85 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2875 (Scalia, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.(emphasis added).
127. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. However, Justice O'Connor has clearly stated that the United
States Supreme Court's abortion decisions are not founded upon the Constitution. In Thornburgh she said:
This Court's abortion decisions have already worked a major distortion in the
Court's constitutional jurisprudence .... Today's decision goes further, and makes
it painfully clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by
this Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion .... That the Court's unworkable scheme for constitutionalizing
the regulation of abortion has had this institutionally debilitating effect should not
be surprising, however, since the Court is not suited to the expansive role it has
claimed for itself in the series of cases that began with Roe v. Wade.
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 814-15 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting) (citations omitted).
128. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 (Scalia, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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ing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society
have permitted it to be legally proscribed."'' 1
Indeed, Roe itself was decided after a series of "substantive due
process' ' 3 2 cases in which the Supreme Court virtually exploded the
meaning of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment "liberty."' 33 The meaning of "liberty" which the Roe Court used would be unrecognizable
to the people who wrote the constitution. 3 4 "Liberty," as that word
was used in the context of the Fifth Amendment, had a narrow and
specific meaning; it stood for freedom from physical restraint, or that
"[n]o freeman shall be taken or imprisoned."' 35 The "life, liberty,

131. Id. Indeed, some commentators suggest that the original concept of liberty of which
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments speak did not contemplate anything more than the
freedom from restraint or imprisonment without due process of law. See Charles E. Shattuck,
The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and Stale Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property, " 4 HAAv. L. REV. 365, 373 (1891). See
also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 32 (1990) ("'due process of law' descended
from the Magna Carta's guarantee that no freeman should be deprived of his liberty except
by the law of the land.").
132. Substantive due process is a judicially created doctrine of the United States Supreme
Court which allows the Court to determine the wisdom of legislation. The Court must "be
convinced that the law-not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, but
its very purpose-is fair, reasonable, and just." J.W. PELTASON, CORWIN & PELTASON'S UNDERSTANDINO THE CONSTITTION 199 (1985). See also BORK, supra note 131, at 31 ("Though
[Justice Taney's] transformation of the due process clause from a procedural to a substantive
requirement was an obvious sham, it was a momentous sham, for this was the first appearance
in American constitutional law of the concept of 'substantive due process,' and that concept
has been used countless times since by judges who want to write their personal beliefs into a
document that, most inconveniently, does not contain those beliefs."). One pro-choice author
has observed that Roe cannot be defended under due process terms. He said:
[tihere have been attempts to defend that decision in what amount to process terms,
arguments that the democratic process is incapable of dealing responsibly with the
excruciating clash of values abortion entails. Such attempts have foundered-in fact
the most notable has been repudiated-for the obvious reason that the genuine source
of trouble in the abortion context is not that the issue is peculiarly unsuited to
democratic decision but rather that democratic decision quite consistently generates
value choices with which many of us, myself included, rather fervently disagree.
John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 11 (1978)
(citations omitted).
133. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (liberty includes the right to
a divorce); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth
and Fifth Amendments emanate a liberty interest in privacy which includes the right to use
contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (liberty includes the right to
attend private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (liberty includes the right to
acquire knowledge).
134. The words in the phrase "life, liberty, or property" had specific meanings when they
were incorporated into the Fifth Amendment. That phrase had been used for several hundred
years with no change in the understood meaning of each of its terms, The meaning of the
phrase traces its origins back to before 1215 A.D. when the concept was incorporated into the
thirty-ninth article of the Magna Charta. Shattuck, supra note 131, at 373. The due process
clause has likewise been perverted by the Supreme Court. See Bruce E. Fein, Comment on
Mathias, 47 MD. L. REV. 196, 202 (1987) ("As Alexander Hamilton declared on the eve of
the Convention: 'the words "due process" have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and proceedings of courts of justice; they can never be referred to the
act of the legislature."').
135. Id. It seems unlikely that the states would insist on the inclusion of all of the first
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or property" phrase of the Fourteenth Amendment is identical to the
one found in the Fifth Amendment, and had the same meaning when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 1 6 Roe was decided as it was
37
because the doctrines of substantive due process and incorporation
allowed the Court to find a right to privacy in "the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action.

'138

Though Roe established a "constitutional right" to an abortion,
Casey has essentially rewritten all prior abortion decisions, including
Roe.'39 If abortion is not a liberty interest which is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the analysis of Roe should end there, and
the matter turned back over to the states.'40 However, rather than
saying that Roe was wrong when it was decided, which is what Justice
O'Connor intimated,' 41 the joint opinion half-heartedly relied on stare
decisis to reaffirm the constitutional right to an abortion. 42 It seems
ten amendments, when they could have used only the "liberty" aspect of the Fifth Amendment
to encompass the provisions of the other amendments. Clearly, "liberty" did not equate with
"civil liberty." See id. at 380. See also Fein, supra note 134 at 202-03.
136. Id. at 383. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "was used in the
same sense and to no greater effect than was its use in the Bill of Rights." Fein, supra note
134, at 202-03 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884)). But see, Ely, supra
note 1,at 935 ("Of course a woman's freedom to choose an abortion is part of the 'liberty'
the Fourteenth Amendment says shall not be denied without due process of law.").
137. The incorporation doctrine suggests that certain judicially selected protections found
in the Bill of Rights control state actions to the same extent as the United States Government
because they are "incorporated" through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. In
Williams v.Florida, 399 U.S. 117 (1970), Justice Stewart described the incorporation doctrine
and his opinion of that doctrine. He said:
The "incorporation" theory postulates the Bill of Rights as the substantive metes
and bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment. I think this theory is incorrect as a matter
of constitutional history, and that as a matter of constitutional law it is both stultifying and unsound. It is, at best, a theory that can lead the Court only to a Fourteenth Amendment dead end. And, at worst, the spell of the theory's logic compels
the Court either to impose intolerable restrictions upon the constitutional sovereignty
of the individual States in the administration of their own criminal law, or else
intolerably to relax the explicit restrictions that the Framers actually did put upon
the Federal Government ....
Id. at 143, (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
139. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818 (removing the trimester approach and establishing viability
as the focal point of abortion regulation).
140. See supra note 131 (discussing the original meaning of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment liberty).
141. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812. See also supra note 127 (Justice O'Connor stating that
the Court's abortion decisions had "worked a major distortion in the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence"). See also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2860 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The joint opinion of Justices O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER
cannot bring itself to say that Roe was correct as an original matter .... ").
142. Justice O'Connor's reliance on stare decisis was half-hearted because the only similarity between the abortion right which Roe established and the right which Casey redefined
is that before viability, a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion. Id. at 2821. The
doctrine of constitutional stare decisis has been suspect for some time. See EDWARD S. CORWIN,
THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 253 (1966) (citing cases ranging from 1932 to
1944, Professor Corwin said, "in the field of constitutional law the doctrine of stare decisis
is today very shaky.").
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that the Casey decision was little more than the Court's attempt to
find a political middle-ground which would placate both sides of the

abortion controversy.

143

In searching for this middle-ground, the Casey Court rewrote the
Roe decision. Roe had some very distinct characteristics, which included the trimester framework, and the varying degrees of state interest throughout pregnancy. Casey, under the auspices of staredecisis,
brushed past the clear and unambiguous language of Roe and essentially stated that what Roe really stood for, that is, its "central
holding," was that a woman has a fundamental right to an abor-

tion.'" Justice Scalia said that the Court's re-affirmance of Roe's
central holding and the "Court's reliance upon stare decisis can best
be described as contrived."' 4 Casey provided the Supreme Court with
an opportunity to return the explosive issue of abortion to the states.
However, through an innovative application of stare decisis,'" the
Court hose to retain control of an issue which it usurped from the

states nearly twenty years earlier.

THE

DISAPPEARANCE OF TRADITIONAL FEDERALISM

Since it is clear that the Supreme Court is unwilling to rectify
the predicament created by Roe, another viable and long-lasting solution to the abortion dilemma must be found.'4 7 Traditional federalism, though it is not currently in vogue, must be re-examined in
light of the current and future needs of this nation. 48 This section

143. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885 (Scalia, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[the
authors of the joint opinion] believe they are bringing to an end a troublesome era in the
history of our Nation and of our Court.").
144. Id. at 2821. Perhaps Casey signals the existence of a new judicial doctrine which
might be known as the "living opinion" theory. Such a concept should easily gain acceptance
among judges, for it would free them from the shackles of stare decisis. No longer would they
need to overrule a prior case in order to reach the result they desire. Under the living opinion
theory, they could merely "interpret" the discussion found in a previous case to mean whatever
they need it to mean in order to achieve the result that they desire. If the Constitution should
evolve to meet political ideals and government practices, should not Supreme Court opinions,
which are inferior to the Constitution, have only evolutionary value as well?
145. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2881. Justice Scalia also said:
[The Court] insists upon the necessity of adhering not to all of Roe, but only to
what it calls the "central holding." It seems to me that stare decisis ought to be
applied even to the doctrine of stare decisis, and I confess never to have heard of
this new, keep-what-you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest version.
Id.
146. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
the joint opinion's version of stare decisis is "newly-minted").
147. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 766.
148. The concept of federalism rapidly deteriorated in this nation as a result of the New
Deal era. Though controversy about the authority which the Supreme Court has granted itself
has existed since its inception, see, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803),
the New Deal Era seems to mark a turning point in the Court's willingness to consistently
"interpret" the constitution in favor of ever-expanding central authority. See, e.g., CORWIN,
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will review the purposes of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment, and will observe that those intended purposes have been
distorted by the Supreme Court in an attempt to centralize power in
the national government.
In Roe, the Court claimed to be making a decision founded upon
constitutional law. 49 The truth or falsity of that assertion depends
on how the Constitution is viewed. Some commentators suggest that
the Constitution is a "living document" which constantly evolves to
meet the needs of society as societal needs change. 50 The other view,
termed original intent, asserts that the Constitution is a static lawthat its various delegations of authority have the same meaning today
that they had when the constitutional provisions were ratified.,
A comprehensive discussion of the philosophical and practical
differences of the views regarding constitutional interpretation is beyond the scope of this comment. For purposes of this comment, the
authors simply embrace the position enunciated by Thomas Jefferson,
that the original intent of the framers is the proper method of constitutional analysis. 2 Jefferson cautioned against judicial construc-

supra note 142, at vi ("The first of the crises ... was the necessity which palpably confronted
the official guardians of the Constitution .. . of providing the New Deal safe habitation within
the Constitutional fold, a necessity which they met by returning to Chief Justice Marshall's
sweeping conception of national supremacy, thereby discarding the century-old theory that the
reserved powers of the States, or at least some of them, formed an independent limitation on
national power."). Professor Corwin went on to characterize the actions of the New Deal
Supreme Court as the "Constitutional Revolution of 1937." Id.
149. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. But see Ely, supra note 1, at 947:
[Roe v. Wade] is, nevertheless, a very bad decision. Not because it will perceptibly
weaken the Court-it won't; and not because it conflicts with either my idea of
progress or what the evidence suggests is society's-it doesn't. It is bad because it
is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives
almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.
Id.
150. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vii (2d ed. 1988) ("the constitution is an intentionally incomplete, often deliberately indeterminate structure for the participatory evolution of political ideals and government practices."). See also Jaffree v. Board of
School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1126 (S.D. Ala. 1983) (finding that
the incorporation doctrine amounts to constitutional amendment by judicial fiat, and that the
First Amendment does not apply to the states).
151. This philosophy has been termed "Original Intent" or "Originalism." See generally,
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). See also ROBERT
BORK, Tit

TEMPTINO OF AMERICA (1990), and RAOUL BERGER,

FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS'

DEsIGN (1987). Original intent is so firmly established in American jurisprudence, that even
the two leading legal encyclopedias state that it is the correct manner of constitutional interpretation. See 16 AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 92 (1979) ("The fundamental principle
of constitutional construction is that effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it. This is the polestar in the construction of constitutions .... "); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 20 (1984) ("The function of the court, in
construing a constitutional provision or an amendment, the importance of which has been
variously characterized, is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers and of the
people who adopted it.").
152. In explaining his view of the Constitution, Jefferson said:
On every question of construction, carry ourselves back to the time when the Con-
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tion, stating that when the Court has the opportunity to expand its
power at the expense of the Constitution, the Court should exercise
restraint."' Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence will be analyzed
from this perspective.
The Original Constitution
The federal form of government described by the original Constitution, and envisioned by those who wrote it, established separation
of powers both horizontally and vertically.1 4 Only specific enumerated areas of control were delegated to the United States government,155 while the states were forbidden from regulating only a few
limited activities." 6 When the states considered ratifying the original

stitution was adopted, recollect the spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of
trying what meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented against it, conform
to the probable one in which it was passed.
15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 499 (A. Bergh ed., 1903). As President, Jefferson also
said:
The Constitution on which our Union rests shall be administered by me according
to the safe and honest meaning contemplated by the plain understanding of the people
of the United States at the time of its adoption-a meaning to be found in the
explanations of those who advocated, not those who opposed it. ... These explanations are preserved in the publications of the time.
10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 248 (A. Bergh ed., 1903).
153. Thomas Jefferson said:
When an instrument admits two constructions, the one safe, the other dangerous,
the one precise, the other indefinite, I prefer that which is safe and precise. I had
rather ask an enlargement of power from the nation, where it is found necessary,
than to assume it by a construction which would make our powers boundless. Our
peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it
a blank paper by construction.
10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 418-19 (A. Bergh ed., 1903). In 1897, the Wyoming
Supreme Court adopted this manner of constitutional interpretation.
In American constitutional law the word "constitution" is used in a restricted sense,
as implying the written instrument agreed upon by the people of the Union, or any
one of the states, as the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments
and officers of the government, in respect to all the points covered by it, which must
control until it shall be changed by the authority which established it.
Rasmussen v. Baker, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897) (citations omitted). See also Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 395 (1856) ("the constitution speaks not only in the same words, but with
the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers,
and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction
would abrogate the judicial character of the Court and make it the mere reflect of the popular
opinion or passion of the day.").
154. "Horizontal separation" is the separation of power between the various branches of
the national government. Vertical separation was established by vesting only specific enumerated
powers in the national government, while reserving all others for the states. See W. CLEON
SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICA 183-88 (1985). A "federal" form of government involves
at least two distinct sovereign entities, i.e. state and national, which operate together to regulate
society. Each is supreme in its own realm. See generally 1 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 243
(Philip B. Kurland et al. eds., 1987); RAOUIL BEROER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN
(1987); WALTER HARTWELL BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM (1964); F. MORLEY,
FREEDOM AND FEDERALISM (1959).
155. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; art. II, §§ 2-3; art. III, § 2.
156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol28/iss2/6

24

Erb and Morensen: Wyoming Fetal Rights - Why the Abortion Albatross Is a Bird of a

1993

COMMENTS

651

Constitution, they initially rejected it.' It was their opinion that the
Constitution did not sufficiently restrict the power of the United States
government.' 58 The Constitution was ratified only after the states received assurances that a Bill of Rights would be amended to the
Constitution. '19

The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to protect individual rights
from an oppressive central government by specifically restricting its
authority.' 60 The Tenth Amendment makes it clear that any authority
not specifically given to the United States, and not denied to the states
by the Constitution, is left to the states to regulate.' 6' In no way did
the Bill of Rights encumber the authority of the states to legislate
in
62
the manner they deemed appropriate for their constituents.
The Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment has substantially eroded the separation of power between the
national government and the states. 63 Shortly after the time of its
ratification, courts understood that the recognized "purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to establish the citizenship of the negro;
to secure to the colored race the benefit of the freedom previously
accorded to them."' However, as a result of the Court's adherence
to the living document theory, the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment has been altered. 6 5 The Fourteenth Amendment now seems to
157. PELTASON, supra note 132, at 135.

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The Tenth Amendment says: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. COSJST. amend. X (emphasis added).
162. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) ("These amendments contain
no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot
so apply them."). Though the Bill of Rights is clearly intended to confine the reach of only
the national government, it is the Bill of Rights which the United States Supreme Court relies
on to justify its intrusion into areas which are exclusively matters of state police power. See
supra note 137 and accompanying text.
163. See Walter J. Suthon, Jr., The Dubious Origin of the Fourteenth Amendment, 28
TUL. L. REV. 22 (1953) (suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment was never properly ratified
by the states); Joseph L. Call, The Fourteenth Amendment and Its Skeptical Background, 13
BAYLOR L. Rav. 1 (1961); Pinckney G. McElwee, The 14th Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States and the Threat That it Poses to Our Democratic Government, 11 S.C.
L. Q. 484 (1959).
164. Le Grand v. United States, 12 F. 577, 582 annot. (C.C.E.D. Tex. 1882). See also
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884) (the Fourteenth Amendment was not "designed
to interfere with the power of the state, sometimes termed its police power ....").
165. As Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissent in Roe v. Wade, "[t]o reach its result,
the Court necessarily .. .had to find within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a right
that was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment." Roe, 410 U.S.
at 174 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). See also Bruce E. Fein, Comment on Mathias, 47 Mo. L.
REv. 196, 203 (1987) ("evidence is overwhelming that the framers of the fourteenth amendment
did not conceive of the due process clause as an open-ended grant of power to apply the Bill
of Rights to the states.").
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stand for the proposition that the United States Supreme Court is
responsible for dictating the social policies of every state in this nation.'6
The idea that the United States Supreme Court alone can fairly
legislate and adjudicate social policies violates traditional federalism. 67 This violation manifests itself in decisions such as Roe and
Casey. The members of state legislatures and judiciaries are no less
capable than their counterparts at the national level of determining
the wisdom and fairness of legislation. The fact that opinions may
differ between various levels of government does not ipsofacto prove
that the policy of the national government is correct.
HARMONIZING FETAL RIGHTS IN THE STATES

Since Roe and Casey were decided as constitutional cases, what

alternatives are left to Wyoming in its desire to resolve the abortion

166. In discussing the Supreme Court's expanded supervision of police powers, Professor
Corwin quoted other commentators who suggested that the Supreme Court had become something of an autocrat. He indicated his agreement, and said:
[T]he late Professor Kales once suggested that attorneys arguing "due process cases"
before the Court ought to address the justices not as "Your Honors," but as "Your
Lordships." Similarly Senator Borah, in the Senate debate on Mr. Hughes's nomination for Chief Justice, declared that the Supreme Court had become, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, "economic dictator in the United States"; and Justice Brandeis characterized the Court as "a superlegislature," while similar views were expressed by the late Justice Holmes shortly before his retirement from the Court.
No doubt there was an element of exaggeration in some, or even all, of the expressions-no doubt, too, it would be rather difficult to indicate very precisely just
wherein the exaggeration lay.
Corwin, supra note 142, at 252. Indeed, some believe that it is the duty of the Supreme Court
to expand the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to ridiculous extremes. See, e.g., Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Fourteenth Amendment
"'liberty' must include the freedom not to conform."). But see Gregory C. Cook, Footnote
6: Justice Scalia's Attempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due Process, 14 HAuv.
J.L. & Pun. Pot'Y 853, 867 (1991) (Justice Brennan's "idea that due process was intended to
protect nonconformist groups or acts against laws imposing accepted national norms is simply
irreconcilable with a great body of precedent and the clear intent of the Framers of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.").
167. The evolution toward central paternalism which this nation has experienced is the
natural result of a judiciary which is willing to "interpret" a new meaning from a constitutional
provision based on what that same court said the provision stood for in a previous case. James
Madison lamented about judges tendency to expand their powers, and said:
It is to be regretted that the Court is so much in the practice of mingling with
their judgments pronounced, comments & reasonings of a scope beyond them; and
that there is often an apparent disposition to amplify the authorities of the Union
at the expense of those of the States. It is of great importance as well as of indispensable obligation, that the constitutional boundary between them should be impartially maintained.
9 THa WRrrnos OF JAMES MADISON 56 (G. Hunt, ed. 1910). See also The Passenger Cases,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 478 (1848) ("If in this court, we are at liberty to give old words new
meaning when we find them in the constitution, there is no power which may not, by this
mode of construction, be conferred on the general government, and denied to the state.")
(Taney, C.J., dissenting).
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dilemma? The authors suggest that there are two solutions which
should be considered by Wyoming and other states: The Casey Solution and the Federalism Solution. The Casey Solution will merely
require the mobilization of traditional law-making procedures.'6
However, this will only provide a partial and temporary solution to
the problem of unregulated abortion.' 69 The Federalism Solution, which
takes a longer-term approach, will re-establish traditional federalism
by amending the Constitution.
The Casey Solution
Five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act were
challenged in Casey; the Court upheld four. The permissible provi70
sions include: (1) a statutory definition for "medical emergency,"'1
7
(2) requirement of informed consent,1 ' (3) requirement of parental
consent, 72 and (4) recordkeeping and reporting requirements for facilities which perform abortions. 173 The Court struck down a requirement that husbands be notified before a married woman could receive
an abortion.' 74 Though Casey did not clearly overrule Roe, it will
provide Wyoming legislators some latitude in forming a state abortion
policy. Meager as that protection may be, Wyoming should take advantage of Casey, and further review Wyoming's current position
regarding fetal rights.
The current Wyoming abortion statutes, though inconsistent with

post-Roe abortion jurisprudence, are consistent with Casey. 75 In ad168. Some have suggested that Wyoming's Abortion Statutes were already harmonious
with the outcome of Casey, though written well before that case. See Laurie Brooke Seidenberg,
President'sReport, THE ADVOCATE, August 1992, p. 1.
[Ilt appears the Supreme Court has decided to allow states to place restrictions
on women and their doctors, restrictions such as waiting periods, mandatory lectures
by doctors on the development of a fetus, and, as we already see in Wyoming,
parental consent mandates, and prohibition of abortion at public expense.
Id.
169. This solution is partial because states are still forbidden from protecting the unborn
before the point of viability. It is temporary because the Supreme Court will someday be
comprised of a different group of justices. It is not too fantastic to suggest that a future court,
with a political agenda similar to that of the Roe Court, would overturn Casey, and return
abortion to its previous status of total unregulability. Additionally, Congress has before it the
Freedom of Choice Act, which would return abortion to its pre-Casey status. Though the
authors of this comment believe that such a law is unconstitutional, for the same reasons
discussed in supra notes 154 through 165 and accompanying text, it is unlikely that such a
law would be held unconstitutional under existing Supreme Court precedent. See also 136 CONG.
REc. E1485-01 (May 10, 1990) (Extension of Remarks of Rep. Dannemeyer) ("The Freedom
of Choice Act is unconstitutional .... The core principle of federalism, enshrined in the Tenth
Amendment and at the heart of the American system of constitutional limited government, is
directly at stake.").
170. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822.
171. Id.at 2822-26.
172. Id.at 2832.
173. Id.at 2832-33.
174. Id.at 2826-32.
175. See supra note 168.
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dition to the existing anti-abortion statutes, several new provisions
for the protection of fetuses have also been proposed, though none
have yet survived the full legislative process. First, a bill entitled the
Wyoming Human Life ProtectionAct was introduced during the 1991
session of the Wyoming Legislature. 17 6 Second, a bill which would
have required a forty-eight hour waiting period before an abortion
could be performed was also introduced during the 1993 legislative
session. 177 Finally, during 1992, enough signatures were received from
Wyoming voters to require an anti-abortion statute to be considered

on the ballot in the 1994 general election. 78 These proposals indicate
that Wyoming is still concerned with the rights of its fetuses.
The Federalism Solution
The decision announced in Casey indicates that the justices of
the United States Supreme Court are still unwilling to restrict their
authority to the boundaries of the written Constitution. Without a
doubt, the safest way to re-establish federalism in this nation is for
the Supreme Court to admit its error, and overrule those cases which
have resulted in usurpation of state police powers. However, the safest path back to federalism also seems to be the least likely. Amending
the United States Constitution, as radical as that may seem, 179 may
be the only way to bring the balance of power between state and
nation back into its proper relationship.8 0
While the United States Constitution was intended to be the supreme law of the land,'' judicial legislation has become an accepted,
176. The Wyoming Human Life Protection Act died in the house judiciary committee.
Telephone Interview with Richard H. Honaker, retired State Representative from Sweetwater
County (Mar. 8, 1993).
177. The bill died in committee because "it was poorly written." Pamela Dickman, Abortion Bill Dies in Legislature, Student Groups React, UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING BRANDING IRON,

Feb. 17, 1993, at 1. An amended version of the bill is expected to be reintroduced in a future
session of the Wyoming Legislature. Id.
178. Pro-choice groups have challenged the initiative in state court and are attempting to
keep it off of the 1994 ballot. Telephone Interview with Richard H. Honaker, retired State
Representative from Sweetwater County (Mar. 8, 1993).
179. The founders of this nation did not perceive constitutional amendment to be a radical
act. It was usurpation which they feared. In his Farewell Address, George Washington said:
If in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification of the Constitutional
powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way
which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for
though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary
weapon by which free governments are destroyed.
35 THE WRrnNGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 229 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
180. The authors do not suggest that abortion is the only social issue which would be
affected by such constitutional reform.
181. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 33, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1991) ("The
ultimate source for constitutional rights is the text of the Constitution. That text, of course,
is silent with respect to abortion; the Constitution leaves this matter to the States, since only
the States possess a general, regulatory police power.") [hereinafter Brief of the United States
of America].
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in some circles a respected, method of deciding cases. 182 Nearly 200
years ago, Thomas Jefferson predicted that this transmutation would
occur. 183 No longer is the written Constitution revered as the final
legal authority in this nation; United States Supreme Court opinions
are now held out as the supreme law of this land. 8 4 The authors of
this comment do not suggest that the Supreme Court should cease
to act as the guardian of the Constitution, but rather, that the Supreme Court has misinterpreted the meaning of the Constitution, and
an appropriate adjustment is now needed. 8 '
Thomas Jefferson suggested that federal judges must somehow
become accountable to the people for their decisions.8 6 Judicial ac-

182. A survey of more than 200 federal and state judges conducted about three years after
the Roe decision reported that "[m]any judges ... labeled Roe v. Wade massive 'judicial
legislation.' For these judges, the justices' opinions on abortion in Roe lacked sufficient reasoning to justify this judicial excursion into the field of morals." Greg A. Caldeira, Judges
Judge the Supreme Court, 61 JUDICATURE 208, 212 (1977) (cited in Utah Brief, supra note
117, at 15). See also Henry Mark Holzer, Texas v. Johnson, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 649
(1990):
Unfortunately, too often constitutional analysis and decision-making is informed
not by text, intention, and precedent but rather by emotion, desire, and anecdote.
When that happens, as it has in this case, we do more than simply make bad constitutional law; we step beyond our role as judges and tread upon political prerogatives. In addition, when we do so in a case such as this one which involves the
social policy of a constituent state of these United States, we undermine a structural
pillar of American constitutionalism: Federalism.
Id.
183. Thomas Jefferson was adamant in his distrust of the judiciary. He predicted that
the United States judiciary would eventually centralize governmental power. He said:
It has long, however, been my opinion, and I have never shrunk from its expression, . . . that the germ of dissolution of our federal government is in the constitution of the federal judiciary; an irresponsible body, (for impeachment is scarcely
a scare-crow) working like gravity by night and by day, gaining a little to-day and
a little to-morrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief, over the field of
jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped from the States, and the government of all
be consolidated into one. To this I am opposed; because, when all government,
domestic and foreign, in little as in great things, shall be drawn to Washington as
the centre of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one government on another, and will become as venal and oppressive as the government
from which we separated.
15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 331-32 (A. Bergh ed., 1903).

184. See, e.g., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLEs EVANS HUGHES 143 (D. Danelski
& J. Tulchin, eds. 1973) ("the Constitution is what judges say it is."). But see, Brief of United
States of America, supra note 181, at 33 ("The ultimate source for constitutional rights is the
text of the Constitution."). See also Simms v. Oedekoven, 839 P.2d 381, 385 (Wyo. 1992)
("In American constitutional law the word "constitution" is used in a restricted sense, as
implying the written instrument agreed upon by the people of the Union, or any one of the
states, as the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and officers of the
government, in respect to all the points covered by it, which must control until it shall be
changed by the authority which established it.") (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 50 P. 819, 823
(1897)).
185. When the Supreme Court interprets a federal statute in a manner which is inconsistent
with congressional intent, Congress can simply amend the statute in order to clarify how the
Supreme Court should interpret it. Likewise, when the Supreme Court misinterprets the Constitution, the'people can amend it in order to rectify the problem. See supra note 179.
186. 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 120-21 (A. Bergh ed., 1903).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1993

29

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 28 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 6

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVIII

countability at the national level can only occur through a constitutional amendment. 8 7 However, while such an amendment in the
past might have deterred the Supreme Court from usurping state autonomy, it seems unlikely that judicial accountability at this late date
would directly aid the reinstatement of traditional federalism.' 8 It
may well be that the damage done to the federal system in this nation
can only be corrected by amending the Constitution with an eye toward directly annulling those aspects of the Constitution which have
been created out of whole cloth by the Supreme Court.
Repealing the Fourteenth Amendment has been suggested,8 9 but
taking such a broad swipe at the problem is both unnecessary and
undesirable."'° An amendment which would simply de-incorporate the
Bill of Rights would be a better approach to re-establishing traditional
federalism in this nation.' 9' Criticism of the incorporation doctrine
has been common since its inception, and commentators have atThere was another amendment of which none of us thought at the time, and in the
omission of which, lurks the germ that is to destroy this happy combination of
National powers in the General government, for matters of National concern, and
independent powers in the States, for what concerns the States severally ....
I deem
it indispensable to the continuance of this government, that they should be submitted
to some practical and impartial control; and that this, to be imparted, must be
compounded of a mixture of State and Federal authorities. It is not enough that
honest men are appointed Judges. All know the influence of interest on the mind
of man, and how unconsciously his judgment is warped by that influence. To fhis
bias add that of the esprit de corps, of their peculiar maxim and creed, that "it is
the office of a good Judge to enlarge his jurisdiction," and the absence of responsibility; and how can we expect impartial decision between the General government,
of which they are themselves so eminent a part, and an individual State, from which
they have nothing to hope or fear?
Jefferson also said:
It should be remembered, as an axiom of eternal truth in politics, that whatever
power in any government is independent, is absolute also; in theory only, at first,
while the spirit of the people is up, but in practice, as fast as that relaxes. Independence can be trusted nowhere but with the people in mass. They are inherently
independent of all but moral law.
15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213 (A. Bergh ed., 1903). See also MICHAEL A. MusMANNO,

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 84-85 (1976).

187. Federal judges are appointed for life, and may be removed only by impeachment.
The Constitution provides that "Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour ....
" U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.
188. However, the nation should plan today for the needs of tomorrow. If past judicial
accountability would have prevented the current state of affairs, it seems reasonable to suggest
that it will also deter the development of new methods of judicial usurpation.
189. MUSMANNO, supra note 186, at 209.
190. The Fourteenth Amendment has had the very desirable effect of requiring states to
treat all people equally, regardless of their race. This aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment
exists independently of the incorporation doctrine and should remain undisturbed.
191. Roe v. Wade was decided under the doctrine of substantive due process, see supra
note 132 and accompanying text. However, the fundamental right to privacy protected by
substantive due process, which the Supreme Court identified in Griswold and later expanded
in Roe, was found in "penumbras, formed by emanations" from the Bill of Rights. Griswold,
381 U.S. at 483. But see infra notes 193 through 195 and accompanying text (observing that
Roe can be interpreted to establish, out of whole cloth, a privacy right which is quite separate
from the privacy established by the line of cases leading up to Roe).
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tacked the validity of the92doctrine, and called on the Court to abandon it, but to no avail.
The apparent difficulty with simply de-incorporating the Bill of
Rights is that Roe can be interpreted to mean that the liberty clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment now has judicially-enhanced meaning
which is separate from the incorporation doctrine. In writing for the
Roe Court, Justice Blackmun observed that the "Constitution does
not explicitly mention any right of privacy."' 193 He went on to say
that "the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution." He then cited a series of cases which relied on various
aspects of the Bill of Rights for the development of a right to privacy. 194 He concluded that Roe was decided upon a right to privacy
found in the Fourteenth Amendment. 95
It may well be that a very specific constitutional amendment will
be needed in order to counteract the Supreme Court's sweeping interpretation of the liberty aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such
an amendment could come in the form of a Right-to-Life Amendment, which recognizes personhood from the moment of conception.1'6 However, from a federalism perspective, this would be
undesirable. Constitutional recognition of fetal personhood would take
the pendulum to the opposite extreme, and would still forbid a state

192. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Conceived in Liberty: The Fourteenth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights, 65 N.C. L. Rav. 889 (1987).
193. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
194. Id. Among those cases, Justice Blackmun cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1922), for the assertion that "the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment" establishes "at least the roots of" the right to privacy. Roe, 410 U.S.
at 152. However, Meyer had nothing to do with a right to privacy. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2859 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the cases relied
on to establish a right to privacy "do not endorse any all-encompassing 'right of privacy."').
In Meyer, the state forbade the teaching of foreign languages in public schools until the eighth
grade. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397. The Court in Meyer stated that the liberty aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399. No privacy interest was challenged in Meyer. The issue argued and decided in Meyer
was the authority for a state to forbid the teaching of foreign languages in public schools
before the eighth grade.
195. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is,
or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.") (emphasis added).
196. See Charles E. Rice, Issues Raised by the Abortion Rescue Movement, 23 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 15 (1989) (quoting Newsweek) ("the right-to-lifers aim at a national movement in
the next few years, dramatic and disruptive enough to force the adoption of a right-to-life
amendment to the Constitution.").
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from balancing the interests of the woman and the fetus. A better
approach would be to narrowly define Fourteenth Amendment liberty. This would allow the state legislatures and courts to determine
which civil liberties shall be allowed and which shall be prohibited
within the jurisdiction of that state. Placing the resolution of civil
liberties back at the local level would eliminate the national schism
that has occurred as a result of decisions such as Roe v. Wade.
CONCLUSION

Wyoming law, with the exception of the United States Supreme
Court imposed abortion jurisprudence, recognizes that a fetus is
granted personhood with its inherent rights, privileges, and remedies.
These rights should not be primarily contingent upon the value which
the fetus' mother places on its life. Abortion is a civil liberty which
is important to a great many people, yet the Supreme Court has
unjustifiably elevated this civil liberty to the status of a fundamental
right. The critical defect with elevating this civil liberty to the level
of a fundamental right is that it ignores the fact that a woman's civil
liberty is not the only interest involved. The woman's interest in an
abortion and the fetus' interest in life are diametrically competing
interests. The appropriate forum for balancing these interests is in
the state legislatures.
Rather than asking the United States Supreme Court to exercise
restraint, the time has come to force the Court to recognize the traditional bounds of federalism by amending the Constitution. The
Constitution was an agreement between the states and the national
government whereby the former created the latter, and agreed to confer certain powers upon it. Agreements between parties should be
construed in light of their intent and understanding at the time that
they entered into the agreement. An agreement between the states
and the national government is no less of an agreement simply because it is called a "Constitution."
Allowing the judiciary to apply their perception of societal norms
rather than the intent of the parties allows the judiciary to subject
the parties to any terms or conditions that the judiciary chooses to
198
fashion. 97 In effect, it places the judges above the Constitution.
197. Thomas Jefferson said: "The Constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing of
wax in the hands of the judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they please."
15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 213 (A. Bergh ed., 1903).

198. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2876 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 621 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting))

("[W]hen a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according to the fixed rules which govern
the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed

to control its meaning, we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of
individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own views of what it ought to mean.").
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Those who ratified the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
did not intend to divest the states of their traditional police powers.
That fact should be clarified for the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court "should get out of this area, where [it does]
neither [itself] nor the country any good by remaining. ' ' 99

RICHARD
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ALAN W.

MORTENSEN

199. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2885 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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